Publications

Refereed articles in journals, practical journals and conference proceedings

• Ehrhart, K.-M., Eicke, A., Hirth, L., Ocker, F., Ott, M., Schlecht, I. and Wang, R. (2025).
  Analysis of a capacity-based redispatch mechanism. Energy Economics, 108751. DOI: 10.1016/j.eneco.2025.108751 
• Ehrhart, K.-M., Eicke, A., Hirth, L., Ocker, F., Ott, M., Schlecht, I. and Wang, R. (2025).
  Congestion Management Games in Electricity Markets. The Energy Journal. Forthcoming.
• Richstein, Jörn C., Eckstein, Johannes, Ehrhart, Karl-Martin, Wang, Runxi et al. (2024).
  Catalysing the transition to a climate neutral industry with Carbon Contracts-for-Difference. Joule. DOI: 10.1016/j.joule.2024.11.003.
• Ehrhart, K.-M., Schlecht, I., Schmitz, J., and Wang, R. (2024).
  A game-theoretic analysis of the interaction between embargoes, price caps and tariffs in EU-Russia gas trade. Journal of Industry, Competition and Trade 24, 21. DOI: 10.1007/s10842-024-00431-8; SharedIt (Read-Only): https://rdcu.be/dXI8e
• Ehrhart, K.-M., Ott, M., Seifert, S. and Wang, R. (2024).
  Combinatorial auctions for renewable energy – potentials and challenges. Energy Policy 186, 113988.
• Ehrhart, K.-M., Ott, M., Seifert, S. and Wang, R. (2024).
  Seebeben der Stärke 12,6: Die rekordbrechende deutsche Offshore-Windenergie-Auktion. Energiewirtschaftliche Tagesfragen 1-2/2024, 20-23.
• Ehrhart, K.-M., Schlecht, I., Schmitz, J. and Wang, R. (2023).
  Comparison of price caps and tariffs to counter a foreign monopoly. Economics Letters, 227, 111128. DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2023.111128. EL55976_Accepted_Manuscript.pdf
• Ehrhart, K.-M., Eicke, A., Hirth, L., Ocker, F., Ott, M.; Schlecht I. and Runxi Wang (2023).
  Strategisches Verhalten im marktbasierten Redispatch: Ergebnisse einer spieltheoretischen Analyse. Energiewirtschaftliche Tagesfragen 1-2/2023, 57-59.
• Fleck, A.-K. and Anatolitis, V. (2022).
  Achieving the objectives of renewable energy policy – Insights from renewable energy auction design in Europe. Energy Policy, Vol. 173. DOI: 10.1016/j.enpol.2022.113357.
• Anatolitis, V., Azanbayev, A. and Fleck A.-K. (2022).
  How to design efficient renewable energy auctions? Empirical insights from Europe. Energy Policy, Vol. 166. DOI: 10.1016/j.enpol.2022.112982.
• Ordoni, E., Bach, J. and Fleck, A.-K. (2022).
  Analyzing and Predicting Verification of Data-Aware Process Models - a Case Study with Spectrum Auctions. in IEEE Access. DOI: 10.1109/ACCESS.2022.3154445.
• Ehrhart, K.-M. and Ocker, F. (2021).
  Design and Regulation of Balancing Power Auctions – An Integrated Market Model Approach. Journal of Regulatory Economics, Vol. 60(1), Seiten 55-73. DOI: 10.1007/s11149-021-09430-7.
• Ehrhart, K.-M., Ocker, F. and Ott, M. (2021).
  Analyse des neu eingeführten Regelarbeitsmarktes. Energiewirtschaftliche Tagesfragen 3/2021.
• Ehrhart, K.-M. and Ott, M. (2020).
  Wirtschaftsnobelpreis: Auktionen in Theorie und Anwendung. Zeitschrift für das gesamte Kreditwesen 22/2020, 1092-1093. 
• Ocker, F. and Jaenisch, V. (2020).
  The Way Towards Harmonised Electricity Intraday Auctions in Europe - Status Quo and Future Developments. Energy Policy, Vol. 145, October 2020. DOI: 10.1016/j.enpol.2020.111731. 
• Kreiss, J., Ehrhart, K.-M., Haufe, M.-C. and Rosenlund Soysal, E. (2021).
  Different cost perspectives for renewable energy support: Assessment of technology-neutral and discriminatory auctions. Economics of Energy and Environmental Policy 10(1). DOI: 10.5547/2160-5890.10.1.jkre. The appendix can be found here.
• Welisch, M. and Kreiss, J. (2019).
  Uncovering Bidder Behaviour in the German PV Auction Pilot: Insights from Agent-based Modeling. The Energy Journal, 40(6). DOI: 10.5547/01956574.40.6.mwel.
• Hanke, A.-K. (2019).
  AURES II - Auctions for Renewable Energy Support. VIK Verband der Industriellem Energie- und Kraftwirtschaft Mitteilungen Ausg. 4/19, 34-35.
• Poplavskaya, K., Ocker, F. and Ehrhart, K.-M. (2019).
  Impact of Short-term Market Sequences on Bidding Behavior of Market Participants. Proceedings of the 3rd European grid Service Market Symposium, 1-13.
• Haufe, M.-C. and Ehrhart, K.-M. (2018).
  Auctions for Renewable Energy Support - Suitability, Design, and First Lessons Learned. Energy Policy, Vol. 121, October 2018, 217-224. DOI: 10.1016/j.enpol.2018.06.027.
• Feige, C., Ehrhart, K.-M. and Krämer, J. (2018).
  Climate Negotiations in the Lab: A Threshold Public Goods Game with Heterogeneous Contributions Costs and Non-binding Voting. Environmental and Resource Economics. DOI: 10.1007/s10640-017-0123-x.
• Ocker, F., Ehrhart, K.-M. and Belica, M. (2018).
  Harmonization of the European Balancing Power Auction: A Game-Theoretical and Empirical Investigation. Energy Economics, Vol. 73C, 194-211. DOI: 10.1016/j.eneco.2018.05.003.
• Ocker, F. (2018).
  "Bid More, Pay Less" - Overbidding and the Bidder's Curse in Teleshopping Auctions. Electronic Markets, Vol. 28(4), 491–508. DOI: 10.1007/s12525-018-0295-4.
• Ocker, F., Ehrhart, K.-M. and Ott, M. (2018).
  Bidding Strategies in Austrian and German Balancing Power Auctions. Wiley Interdisciplinary Reviews - Energy and Environment 7(6). DOI: 10.1002/wene.303; featured auf Advanced Science News; Previously published in the proceedings of the 10th International Conference on Energy Economics and awarded with the "Young Scientist Best Paper Award".
• Kreiss, J., Ehrhart, K.-M. and Hanke, A.-K. (2017).
  Auction-theoretic analyses of the first offshore wind energy auction in Germany. Journal of Physics: Conference Series, Vol. 926, conference 1. DOI: doi.org/10.1088/1742-6596/926/1/012015.
• Ocker, F. and Ehrhart, K.-M. (2017).
  Kurzfristige Kehrtwende bei der Beschaffung neu zu errichtender Anlagen für die Netzreserve in Deutschland - Ein ökonomischer Erklärungsansatz. Zeitschrift für Energiewirtschaft, Vol. 41, March 2017, 23-32. DOI: 10.1007/s12398-016-0188-1.
• Ocker, F. and Ehrhart, K.-M. (2017).
  The "German Paradox" in the Balancing Power Markets. Renewable and Sustainable Energy Reviews, Vol. 67, 892-898. DOI: 10.1016/j.rser.2016.09.040.
• Kreiss, J., Ehrhart, K.-M. and Haufe, M.-C. (2017).
  Appropriate Design of Auctions for Renewable Energy Support - Prequalifications and Penalties. Energy Policy, Vol. 101, February 2017, 512-520. DOI: 10.1016/j.enpol.2016.11.007.

Scientific recommendations and advice

• Hanke, A.-K. and Tiedemann, S. (2020)
  How (not) to respond to low competition in renewable energy auctions, Policy Brief, AURES II - EU-Horizon2020 project
• Ehrhart, K.-M., Hanke, A.-K. and Ott, M. (2019)
  Endogene Rationierung in Ausschreibungen für erneuerbare Energien: Verdrängung von Angebot statt Schaffung von Wettbewerb, ZEW Kurzexpertise
• Ehrhart, K.-M., Hanke, A.-K. and Ott, M. (2019)
  Endogene Rationierung in Ausschreibungen für erneuerbare Energien: Verdrängung von Angebot statt Schaffung von Wettbewerb
• Mora et al. (2017)
  Auctions for renewable energy support - Taming the beast of competitive bidding 
• Haufe, M.-C., Kreiss, J. and Ehrhart, K.-M. (2017)
  The Winner's Curse in Discriminatory and Uniform Price Auctions under Varying Competition Levels
• Kitzing et al. (2016)
  Recommendations on the role of auctions in a new renewable energy directive
• Kreiss (2016)
  The effect of competition levels on auction outcomes, Policy Memo 4
• Haufe et al. (2016)
  Assessment of auction types suitable for RES-E
• Klessmann et al. (2015)
  Ausschreibungen für erneuerbare Energien, Wissenschaftliche Empfehlung im Auftrag des Bundesministeriums für Wirtschaft und Energie (BMWi) (englische Version)

Working Papers